ABSTRACT The remote transmission of tumor ultrasound images is an important link in telemedicine. Based on the Galois field (GF), this paper proposes an encryption algorithm that ensures the security of tumor ultrasound images (TUIs) during the transmission. First, the grayscale image of the TUI was generated by the secure hash algorithm 1 (SHA-1) algorithm, and the resulting hash value was taken as the medical record summary, which was used to monitor the transmission of the TUI. Second, the 2D ciphertext image was expanded into 1D vectors, and the TUI was encrypted with the non-repetitive scrambling algorithm, coupled with two diffusion algorithms. The simulation results show that the coupled algorithm can ensure the safety of the TUIs in remote transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of health information technology, doctors are now able to exchange information with patients in the telemedicine environment. In this way, the repetitive testing, examination and medication are greatly reduced, and the medical resources are used more efficiently [1] . However, the information exchange may endanger the safety of the tumor ultrasound images (TUIs). During the transmission, the TUIs may be exposed to risks like theft, duplication, leakage and tampering. Thus, it is necessary to develop a TUIs encryption method that protects information authenticity, data integrity and patient privacy [2] .
With high redundancy, huge amount of data and strong pixel correlation, the TUIs cannot be encrypted satisfactorily by the traditional encryption algorithms [3] . Neither can the TUIs be encrypted desirably by the recent digital image encryption methods [4] - [7] , which have small key space and large error of information entropy. In fact, the TUIs encryption has not been studied intensively.
Chaotic encryption has long been proved as an effective alternative [8] , but only Henon chaotic algorithm has been applied to encrypt the TUIs [9] . However, Henon, as a simple
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2D nonlinear chaotic system, still faces the small key space and poor security of low-dimensional chaotic systems [10] . Arya et al. [11] generated a medical record summary by MD5 message-digest algorithm, yet this algorithm has been cracked and exposed to security risks.
In view of the above, this paper uses the secure hash algorithm 1 (SHA-1) to monitor the safety of TUIs transmission, and generate A 160-bit hash value as medical record summary. In addition, the TUIs were encrypted by two diffusion algorithms, namely, non-repetitive scrambling of 2D image into 1D vector and multiplication in Galois field (GF) (24). Then, the ciphertext image was converted from the TUIs by 3D Lorenz chaotic map [12] . After the conversion, the attacker can only see the ciphertext image, rather than the actual tumor ultrasound images. Finally, the decrypted image was coded by the SHA-1 and matched with the sender's UTI summary, to see if the UTIs had been tampered in the transmission process.
II. DESIGN OF ENCRYPTION PLAN A. ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
The SHA is a family of cryptographic hash functions published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology as a U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS).
This algorithm can create a 160-bit information summary through plaintext-string conversion, complementary operations and additional length calculation [13] . It was soon replaced by the slightly revised version SHA-1, a 160-bit hash function which resembles the earlier MD5 algorithm. However, any slight change of the plaintext information in the image will cause significant variation in the calculated hash value. If applied to the TUIs, the SHA-1 encryption process is equivalent to creating a ''fingerprint'' of the record. In this paper, the dynamic equations of Lorenz system mapping are introduced: The GF is an important, non-empty field in cryptography. The elements in the GF can be considered as the results of mode p GF (p), where p is a prime number. In practice, GF (p w ) is often employed to prevent data missing, with p being a prime number whose value is usually set to 2. The GF elements can be generated by primitive polynomials. The domain obtained by primitive polynomials has an additive unit of 0 and a multiplicative unit of 1. Our research selects the reduced polynomial m(x) = x 4 + x + 1in GF (2 4 ). 
where, P is a 1D vector expanded from plaintext; C and S are cryptographic vectors, whose initial values C 0 and S 1 are derived from keys i = 1, 2, . . . , M × N ; H and L are respectively the higher and lower 4 bits of the data.
To sum up, the ciphertext image of the TUI can be obtained through one scrambling and two diffusions. The decryption is the reverse of the encryption process.
III. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
The proposed algorithm was simulated on the Matlab to verify its feasibility. Exhaustive attack method was used to attack the encrypted image. The ciphertext image of the encrypted TUI was sent to the receiver, who decrypted the image and encoded the generated hash value, 42817e38ab192e6b3bb2491578ab3cf65a5cf7ec, by the SHA-1. If the image is changed in propagation, the hash value should be changed to: b3df52208a35ba5a0ada568 62a07a7a0b7f9d3bb (this value varies with the positions). Then, the receiver looked up the hash value in the sender's medical record summary. If it was not found, the TUI must have been tampered during the transmission. be evaluated by x 2 test. The x 2 generally has a negative correlation with the uniformity of the image pixel grayscale histogram, and the resistance to the attack of statistical analysis. Figures 6 and 7 respectively show the plaintext and ciphertext histograms of the TUI; Table 1 lists the x 2 values of the plaintext and ciphertext images of the TUI.
Obviously, the grayscale of the ciphertext image was closer to uniform distribution than that of the plaintext image, indicating the good effect of the encryption process.
B. CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The strong correlation between adjacent pixels in the plaintext image contains some information about the image. If it is manipulated by the attacker, the image content may be leaked [15] . Thus, a good encryption algorithm should weaken the pixel correlation of the image. To test the weakening effect of our algorithm, 2,000 pairs of adjacent pixels were randomly selected from the plaintext and ciphertext images of the TUI, and the horizontal, vertical, positive diagonal and negative diagonal pixel correlations were calculated:
where, cov (u,
; u = {u i } and v = {v i } are two vectors. Note that N is an arbitrary logarithm of adjacent pixels, whose grayscales are (u i , v i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The correlation images were plotted as Figure 8 .
It can be seen that the pixel correlation decreased significantly after encryption, meaning that the image content has been protected well.
C. INFORMATION ENTROPY ANALYSIS
The uncertainty of image information can be measured by information entropy, which is positively correlated with the amount of information and the randomness of the events. To verify the effect of our algorithm, the information entropies of the plaintext and ciphertext images of the TUI were calculated as:
where, L is the grayscale of the image; P(i) is the occurrence probability of grayscale i. For the image with the grayscale L = 256, the simulated and theoretical information entropies H were both 8 for the ciphertext of TUI. In addition, the classical image Lena was encrypted by the proposed algorithm and the algorithms in References [16] and [17] . As shown in Table 3 , the information entropy of the image was closer to 8 after being encrypted by our algorithm than by the other two algorithms. This means our encryption algorithm can resist data attack more effectively than other algorithms.
D. KEY SPACE AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Key space refers to the set of all legal keys. Its size is positively correlated with the encryption effect. In this paper, the keys are the initial parameter values of the Lorenz system: K = {x 0 , y 0 , z 0 , w 0 }, where x 0 ∈ (−40, 40), y 0 ∈ (−40, 40), z 0 ∈ (−1, 81) and w 0 ∈ (−250, 250). Since the step lengths of x 0 , y 0 and z 0 are 10 −13 and the step length of w 0 is 10 −12 , the key space was calculated as 2.56×10 59 and about 197 bit, which is larger than the key space in Reference [16] ( (10 16 ) 2 ).
Thus, the proposed algorithm is proved effective in resisting violent attacks. Then, some minor changes were made to the keys before TUI encryption. If the ciphertext image thus obtained differs greatly from that encrypted by the original keys, the encryption must be highly sensitive to the keys.
The difference in key sensitivity between images of the same size can be evaluated by the number of pixels' change rate (NPCR), unified averaged changed intensity (UACI) and blocked average changing intensity (BACI). The NPCR stands for the ratio of the number of different pixels to the total number of pixels:
where,
The UACI measures the mean ratio of the difference between the corresponding pixels to the maximum difference (255) between the two images:
The BACI can be calculated as:
where, m is the small image block, i = 1, 2, . . . , (M − 1)(N − 1); M × N is the size of images P 1 and P 2 . The BACI is often obtained in three steps: computing the absolute value of the difference image between the two images; decomposing the image; calculating the ratio of the absolute value of the difference between any two pixels of all small images to the maximum difference (255) between the two images. Here, 1,000 values are selected randomly from the key space, and the mean values of 1,000 NPCRs, UACIs and BACIs are calculated by changing x 0 , y 0 , z 0 by 10 −13 and w 0 by 10 −12 , respectively. The results are listed in Table 4 . The calculated results were close to the theoretical expectations of 99.603%, 33.472% and 26.780%, revealing that the ciphertext differs greatly after a slight change to the keys. It also shows that our encryption algorithm is highly sensitive to keys and resistant to differential attacks.
To sum up, the proposed algorithm is more efficient in dealing with common size images. Even if the target image is of a large size, our algorithm can outperform the general encryption algorithm in speed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Focusing on security of TUI remote transmission, this paper develops a TUI encryption algorithm based on chaotic mapping and the GF. The algorithm combines encryption and monitoring of the transmitted TUI to enhance image security and reliability. The simulation results show that the proposed algorithm enjoys a large key space and effective resistance to violence, statistics and differential attacks, as well as a strong potential for application in telemedicine. The future research will further improve the encryption and decryption efficiency of the proposed algorithm.
